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Abstract
This paper aims to provide an overview of ASEAN economic 
integration, inter-state development gaps among the ASEAN 
members, especially between the original members and latecomers. 
Furthermore, it also examines the industrial policies implemented 
by one of the latecomers, Cambodia, with special focuses on the 
privatization of State-owned Enterprises (SOE), Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) inflow attraction policies, and the establishment 
of Special Economic Zones (SEZ). 
Cambodia underwent a drastic economic reform after its 
transition towards a market economy in 1989. The privatization of 
SOE positively contributed to the alleviation of the government’s 
fiscal burdens and the attraction of FDI greatly contributed to the 
employment creation, an increase in state’s revenue, and in the 
long run, potential transfer of technology. The establishment of 
SEZ in 2006 further stimulates the attraction of FDI and this will 
likely play a crucial role as part of the production network in the 
regional division of labor in the future.
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INTRODUCTION:
Over the past three decades, economic integration through trade and 
investment has been a major force of growth for ASEAN. At its establish-
ment in 1967, the primary objective of ASEAN was to contribute to the po-
litical stability in the region. Today, the emphasis has shifted dramatically 
towards economic benefits. At the Bali Summit in October 2003, the ASE-
AN heads of state agreed and declared to establish the ASEAN Communi-
ty by 2020. Later, in January 2007 at the Cebu Summit, ASEAN leaders 
agreed to expedite the integration of the ASEAN Community by 2015, es-
pecially to hasten the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community 
and to transform ASEAN into a single market and production base, com-
petitive economic region, equitable economic development, that is integrat-
ed into the global economy (ASEAN, 2008). 
Despite the efforts to promote the economic integration, a develop-
ment gap still remains in the region, especially between the original mem-
bers, the so-called ASEAN 6 ((Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand) and latecomers, the so-called CLMV (Cambodia, 
Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam). Various initiatives to narrow these gaps have 
been formulated and implemented, including the Initiative for ASEAN In-
tegration (IAI), the Ayeyarwady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Coopera-
tion Strategy (ACMECS), and the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS). 
Among them, the most comprehensive and successful economic coopera-
tion program is considered to be the GMS program initiated by the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB). The GMS program was started in 1992 with its 
members comprising Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Yun-
nan Province and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region of China. 
This paper aims to provide a brief overview of ASEAN economic inte-
gration, inter-state development gaps and to examine the industrial poli-
cies implemented by one of the latecomers, Cambodia, in order to catch up 
with the original members. 
1. OVERVIEW OF ASEAN
The ASEAN was established in August 1967 with 5 original members: 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei 
Darussalam joined ASEAN in January 1984. Vietnam joined in July 1995, 
ASEAN Economic Integration and Cambodia’s Industrial Policies（NGOV）2011】 69
Lao PDR and Myanmar in July 1997, and Cambodia in January 1999, 
making up ASEAN’s 10 member states. 
ASEAN was set up as an association for regional cooperation with the 
aim “to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural devel-
opment in the region, to promote regional peace and stability, to promote 
active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest 
in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative 
fields, and to collaborate more effectively for the greater utilization of 
their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade” (ASEAN 
Secretariat 1967). Despite its emphasis on economic cooperation, ASEAN 
was at that time more concerned with political stability in the region, par-
ticularly the fight against communism. The economic accomplishments of 
ASEAN states were mainly the result of individual achievements com-
bined with fortuitous events in the larger international economy. Their 
economic success has no direct connection with ASEAN as an institution 
(Narine, 2002). 
The intra-ASEAN economic cooperation was formally started follow-
ing the “Declaration of ASEAN Concord” at the first ASEAN Summit in 
1976. This economic cooperation was based on a report formulated by a 
United Nations team and carried out based on “ASEAN’s Strategy for Col-
lective Import Substitution Industrialization for Heavy and Chemical In-
dustries (ASEAN’s Strategy for CISI)” (Shimizu, 2004). Based on this re-
port, the ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements (ASEAN-PTA, 
signed in February 1977), the ASEAN Industrialization Project (AIP, 
signed in March 1980), and the ASEAN Industrial Complementation (AIC, 
signed in June 1981) were created to promote intra-regional trade by low-
ering tariffs and enhancing complementary relationship among industries. 
However, these initiatives failed due to the protectionist policies towards 
their industries and policies to discourage Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) by imposing market restrictions on foreign firms.
In 1987, at the 3rd ASEAN Summit, ASEAN shifted its strategy from 
CISI to “ASEAN’s Strategy for Collective FDI-dependent and Export-ori-
ented Industrialization (ASEAN’s Strategy for CFEI)” (ibid, 2004). This 
strategy later became the foundation of the current intra-ASEAN econom-
ic cooperation, including the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA, signed in 
1992 and took effect in 1993), and ASEAN Industrial Cooperation (AICO, 
signed in 1996). AFTA is a regional trade agreement set to reduce tariff 
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rates among its members in order to promote a more active trade ex-
change. The AICO Scheme is an industrial cooperation program to pro-
mote joint manufacturing industrial activities between ASEAN-based 
companies in order for the firms to enjoy preferential tariff rates. 
In July 1997, the Asian Financial Crisis triggered by the collapse of 
the Thai Baht shocked many Asian countries. The gravity of the impact 
proved the fragility of the economic foundation of each ASEAN member 
state. Taking the crisis seriously, the ASEAN countries called for further 
intensification of ASEAN’s economic cooperation in order to protect the 
ASEAN’s interest. In December 1997, “ASEAN Vision 2020” was adopted 
with the long-term commitment to achieve economic integration by 2020”. 
It is committed to moving towards “closer cohesion and economic integra-
tion, narrowing the gap in the level of development among member coun-
tries”, with the objective to “create a stable, prosperous and highly compet-
itive ASEAN Economic Region in which there is a free flow of goods, 
services and investments, a freer flow of capital, equitable economic devel-
opment and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities” (ASEAN Sec-
retariat, 1997). 
In October 2003, the ASEAN leaders formally agreed and declared to 
set up the ASEAN Community by 2020. The declaration stated that, “ASE-
AN Community is comprised of three pillars, namely political and security 
cooperation, economic cooperation, and socio-cultural cooperation” (ASE-
AN Secretariat, 2003). Later in January 2007 at the Cebu Summit, as 
stated in the “Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of the Establishment 
of an ASEAN Community by 2015”, ASEAN leaders agreed to expedite the 
integration of ASEAN Community by 2015, especially to hasten the estab-
lishment of the ASEAN Economic Community and to transform ASEAN 
into a single market and production base, competitive economic region, eq-
uitable economic development, and global economic integration (ASEAN 
Secretariat, 2007). The main impetus behind the acceleration of this eco-
nomic community is the growing influences of the two most populous and 
dynamic economies of China and India. It was widely believed that the 
rapid growth of Chinese manufactured exports and IT-linked services from 
India are reshaping the geographical redistribution of industry and capi-
tal flows. These developments can pose a major threat for ASEAN as a re-
gion, as they are likely to change the patterns of trade, investment, and 
production. Therefore, ASEAN needed to respond strategically and swiftly 
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to these changing environments in order to maintain its position as an im-
portant growth pole in the world economy.
Despite various ASEAN initiatives towards economic integration, the 
progress has been very slow. Other than tariff reductions under the Com-
mon Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme, non-tariff barriers such 
as restrictive regulations and technical measures have not been removed. 
Cross Border Trade Transportation (CBTA) procedures are complicated 
and in many cases are not well implemented on the ground, especially for 
the less developed CLMV countries. The development gap between the 
more developed ASEAN 6 and less developed CLMV is considered a hin-
drance to economic integration. 
1.1 ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)
The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) is a regional trade bloc agree-
ment by the ASEAN signed in 1992 that came into force in 1993. The pri-
mary goals of AFTA are three-fold. First, it aims to promote regional 
trades through the elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers among 
ASEAN members. Second, it tries to strengthen ASEAN’s competitive edge 
as a production base in the international market. Third, AFTA seeks to 
promote domestic or regional investments and to attract more Foreign Di-
rect Investment (FDI) into the region so that jobs can be created and tech-
nology can be transferred.
The key mechanism to achieve the goals of AFTA is widely known as 
the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme. The CEPT 
scheme is a cooperative arrangement among the ASEAN member states to 
reduce intra-regional tariff to 0-5% and remove non-tariff barriers over a 
10-year period, starting from January 1, 1993. The CEPT scheme was orig-
inally signed by the original ASEAN member states (ASEAN 6) at the 4th 
ASEAN Summit in January 1992 to establish AFTA by 2008. However, 
during the ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) Meeting in September 
1994, this target date was advanced to 2003.
Under the CEPT scheme, the products are, in principle, grouped into 5 
categories: Inclusion List (IL, refers to the products that are subject to tar-
iff reduction), Temporary Exclusion List (TEL, refers to the products that 
are subject to tariff reduction but are not yet ready for the enforcement), 
Sensitive List (SL, refers to unprocessed agricultural products or products 
that can be flexibly phased-in to IL), Highly Sensitive List (HSL, refers to 
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rice related products), and General Exclusion List (GEL, refers to products 
that are deemed necessary for the national security, public morals, public 
health, etc). The TEL, SE, and HSL are gradually shifted to IL and then 
are subject to tariff reduction and removal. 
The original schedule for AFTA-CEPT was to reduce the tariff rate of 
IL by less than 20% within 5 to 8 years starting from 1993, the year it 
took effect. Additionally, those products with a tariff rate of 20% or less 
were set to be reduced to 0-5% during 2001-2008. However, the accession 
of Vietnam to ASEAN in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia 
in 1999, prompted ASEAN to modify its schedule, providing more flexibili-
ty to these latecomers. For details of the schedule, see Figure 1. 
The present goal to completely eliminate tariffs on all products except 
those covered by the Protocol on Sensitive and Highly Sensitive Products 
was set by 2010 for ASEAN 6 and 2015 for CLMV. However, it should be 
noted that all agriculture products except rice (for the Philippines and In-
donesia) and sugar (Indonesia), which were considered highly sensitive 
products, are now in the CEPT Inclusion List. Other areas of economic, so-
cial, and political cooperation including services, investment, intellectual 
property rights (IPR), labor migration, are covered in separate agree-
ASEAN 6:  
Thailand, Singapore, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Philippines, Brunei
IL: 0-5% 
(with some excep ons)
2002 2003 2005 2007 20152010
IL: 0-5% 
 (80% of IL: 0%)
IL: 0% 
CLMV: 
Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar, Vietnam
Vietnam: 
1995 accession IL: 0-5% 
 (with some excep ons)
IL: 0-5%
(80% of IL: 0%)
2006
Myanmar, Laos: 
1997 accession IL: 0-5% 
 (60% of IL: 0%)
IL: 0-5% 
 (80% of IL: 0%)
2008 2012
Cambodia: 
1999 accession IL: 0-5% 
 (60% of IL: 0%)
2010
2015
IL: 0%
 (with 
some 
excep ons 
un l 2015)
For SL and HSL: 
Vietnam:  0-5% by 2013 
Laos, Myanmar: 0-5% by 2015 
Cambodia: 0-5% by 2017
Figure 1: Schedule of CEPT Tariff Reduction/Elimination
Source: JETRO (2009). Translated by the Author.
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ments, not directly in AFTA (UN-ESPCAP, 2008). 
1.2 Development Gap in ASEAN
There is a large development gap in ASEAN, especially between the 
original members (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singa-
pore, and Thailand) and latecomers (Cambodia Laos, Myanmar, and Viet-
nam; namely CLMV). Although the definition of development gap may differ 
depending on the user, the author uses some representative macroeconomic 
indicators to gauge these divides. 
A) GDP Per Capita: 
Using the current U.S. dollar terms, the national GDP in 2009 of ASE-
AN 6 (1,355 billion USD) is approximately 10 times that of CLMV (139 bil-
lion USD). Similarly the population of ASEAN 6 (423 million people) is 
about 2.7 times that of CLMV (158 million people). Hence, in current pric-
es the per capita income of ASEAN 6 is nearly 5 times that of CLMV. Tak-
ing the per capita GDP of Singapore (36,537 USD) and Brunei (34,827 
USD) which have first world income levels, they exceed that of Myanmar 
(420 USD), which has the lowest income level in the region, by more than 
80 times. Even when Singapore and Brunei are not considered, income 
gaps also exist in ASEAN 6. For example, the per capita of Malaysia (7,030 
USD) is 4 times that of the Philippines and almost twice that of Thailand 
(See Table 1). 
Table 1: Macroeconomic Indicators of ASEAN
Country
Population
(2009; Million)
Nominal GDP
(2009; Billion 
USD)
Per capita 
GDP
(2009; USD)
Average Real 
GDP Growth Rate
(2000-2009; %)
ASEAN-6
Brunei 0.40 14.15 1 34,827 1 2.28 2
Indonesia 229.96 540.27 2,349 5.1
Malaysia 27.47 193.09 7,030 4.8
Philippines 91.98 161.20 1,752 4.56
Singapore 4.99 182.23 36,537 5.59
Thailand 67.76 263.77 3,893 4.06
CLMV
Cambodia 14.81 10.45 706 8.14
Lao P.D.R. 6.32 5.94 940 6.69
Myanmar 50.02 24.97 1 420 1 12.98 3
Vietnam 87.28 97.18 1113 7.27
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators Online. Accessed July 11, 2011. 
Note: 1: Data from ASEAN (2010); 2: Due to data limitation, the average during 2000-2007 is calculat-
ed; 3: Due to data limitation, the average during 2000-2006 is calculated.
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B) Economic Structure
The economic structure is generally an important indicator of develop-
ment level of a country. In principle, at an early stage of development, a 
country tends to have a large share of agriculture; however, as the country 
develops, the share of agriculture tends to decrease and that of industry 
and services tend to increase. Looking at ASEAN’s case, as Table 2 indi-
cates, for ASEAN 6 in 2009, on average, the share of agriculture accounted 
for 9% and industry accounted for 44% of GDP. In contrast, for CLMV in 
the same year, the share of agriculture and industry to GDP accounted for 
32% and 29%, respectively. This suggests that the economic structure of 
ASEAN 6 is already industry-based, while the economic structure of 
CLMV is still agrarian. However, it should also be noted that, among 
CLMV countries, Vietnam has been transforming rapidly to a more indus-
try-oriented economy in comparison with other members in the last dec-
ade. Its share of agriculture has decreased significantly from 30% in 1993 
to 21% in 2009. From this figure we can conclude that Vietnam is heading 
the other latecomers in terms of industrialization. 
Table 2: Economic Structure and Human Development Index of ASEAN
Country
Share of Agri-
culture in GDP 
(%), 2009
Share of Indus-
try in GDP (%), 
2009
Share of Service 
in GDP (%), 
2009
Human
Development
Index, 2010
ASEAN 6
Brunei 1 0.7 71.0 28.3 0.805
Indonesia 15.8 49.1 35.1 0.600
Malaysia 9.5 44.3 46.2 0.744
Philippines 14.9 30.2 54.9 0.683
Singapore 2 0 26.0 74.0 0.846
Thailand 11.6 43.3 45.1 0.654
CLMV
Cambodia 35.3 22.7 42.0 0.494
Lao P.D.R. 2 34.7 28.2 37.1 0.497
Myanmar 3 38.2 24.4 37.4 0.451
Vietnam 20.9 40.2 38.9 0.572
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, Online (Accessed July 15, 2011). 
UNDP, Human Development Index Online (Accessed July 15, 2011). 
Note: 1. Share for the year 2007 (WDI); 2. Share for the year 2008 (WDI); 3. Share for the year 2009 
(ADB, Key Indicators 2010)
C) Human Development Index
Human development index (HDI) was first introduced by the UNDP 
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in its Human Development Report (HDR) in 1991 as a new way to meas-
ure development. It combines indicators of life expectancy, educational at-
tainment, and per capital income into a composite index, with equal 
weighting and ranges from 0 (worst) to 1 (best). The breakthrough for HDI 
was the creation of a single statistic that can be used to measure both eco-
nomic and social development. As indicated in Table 2, the HDI in 2010 for 
the small states of Singapore and Brunei are characterized as “Very High 
Human Development”, Malaysia and the Philippines as “High Human De-
velopment”. In the same year, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos, and 
Cambodia are characterized as “Medium Human Development”, and My-
anmar as “Low Human Development”. Therefore, we can conclude that, 
based on HDI as development indicator, there is still a wide economic and 
social development gap between ASEAN 6 and CLMV.
1.3 External Trade and FDI Inflow
The main objective of ASEAN Economic Integration is to promote in-
tra-regional and international trade and to attract FDI in order to en-
hance the region’s economic competiveness in the international market. As 
a group, ASEAN is considered highly integrated into the world economy. 
However, trade imbalances between ASEAN 6 and CLMV still remain. As 
implicitly indicated in Table 3, ASEAN 6 is dominant in exports and gen-
erates trade surplus, while CLMV tends to generate trade deficits. This 
phenomenon can partly be explained by the difference in economic struc-
ture and tariffs between ASEAN 6 and CLMV. ASEAN 6 has a higher 
share of the industrial sector while CLMV is still more agrarian-based (See 
Table 2). Given that industrial products are more tradable than agricultur-
al ones, the difference in economic structure can partially explains the 
higher level of trade liberalization of ASEAN 6 in comparison with CLMV.
Another important factor contributing to the difference in trade open-
ness between ASEAN 6 and CLMV is the tariff rate imposed by each coun-
try. Although intra-ASEAN tariff in general is on a declining trend, ASE-
AN 6 is moving faster to reduce and eliminate this tariff barrier. As 
illustrated in Figure 1, under the AFTA-CEPT scheme, ASEAN 6 is set to 
reduce the tariff rate of all the products in the Inclusion List (IL) to zero 
by 2010; however, CLMV is provided flexibility until 2015. 
Another important factor for the economic development of ASEAN 
economies is the attraction of FDI. ASEAN 6 including Thailand and Ma-
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laysia benefited greatly from the inflows of Japanese FDI after the appre-
ciation of Yen following the plaza accord in 1985. As Table 3 indicates, 
among CLMV, Vietnam has been very successful in attracting FDI, ac-
counting for approximately 10 times that of Cambodia and 28 times that of 
Laos during 2001-2010. If we look at the average of FDI inflows as percent-
age of gross fixed capital formation, excluding Brunei and Singapore, we 
can say that CLMV countries are about 2 times as reliant on FDI inflows 
as their source of investment in comparison with the original members.
Table 3: Balance of Trade and Net FDI Inflow of ASEAN
Country
Trade Net FDI
Inflow during 
2001-2010c,
Million USD
FDI Inflows/Gross 
Fixed Capital 
Formationd during 
2001-2010, %
Export/GDP 
2009, %
Import/GDP 
2009, %
ASEAN 6
Brunei 67.6a 27.8a 7,358 67.3 
Indonesia 24.1 21.3 46,372 3.3 
Malaysia 96.4 74.9 47,279 13.7 
Philippines 31.7 30.8 15,146 8.6 
Singapore 220.5b 202.6b 198,802 59.0 
Thailand 68.4 57.9 67,685 13.6 
CLMV
Cambodia 59.6 62.7 4,377 29.6 
Laos PDR 32.7b 44.4b 1,501 15.3 
Myanmar na na 4,615 23.2 
Vietnam 68.3 78.6 42,072 17.1 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, Accessed June 23, 2011. UNCTAD (2011), World 
Investment Report. Annex Table 1 and Table 5.
Note: a. Data for 2007 (WDI); b. Data for 2008 (WDI); c. Total net FDI inflow during 2001-2010; d. Average 
of FDI inflows as percentage of gross fixed capital formation during 2001-2010.
2. OVERVIEW OF CAMBODIAN ECONOMY AND ITS INDUSTRIAL POLICIES
Cambodia joined ASEAN in 1999, 6 years after the UN-backed gener-
al election (1993) and 10 years after its transition towards a market-ori-
ented economy. In 2004, Cambodia joined the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). Regional and global integration has acted as an external pressure 
for the Cambodian government to speed up the transition and reform pro-
cess. In order to conform to the ASEAN and WTO rules, and with support 
from development partners, Cambodia had carried out drastic economic, 
administrative, and legal reforms towards a more democratic and market-
oriented political and economic system. Although some of the reform pro-
grams are still underway, Cambodia is now becoming one of the most open 
ASEAN Economic Integration and Cambodia’s Industrial Policies（NGOV）2011】 77
economies in the region. This section provides an overview of Cambodian 
macroeconomic performance after 1993, followed by discussions on its in-
dustrial policies. 
2.1 Overview of Cambodian Economy after 1993
In August 1994, the National Assembly approved and passed the Law 
on Investment (LOI), expressing the willingness and commitment of the 
government to attract foreign investments into the country. On the other 
hand, it also reflected the needs of external sources of capital to revitalize 
the devastated domestic economy after more than two decades of civil war. 
Since the onset of the transition, the Cambodian economy experienced a 
very rapid growth. The gross domestic product (GDP) tripled from 3.4 to 
10.4 billion USD during 1994-2009, with average the annual growth rate 
at approximately 7.8%. In the four consecutive years from 2004 to 2007 it 
exceeded 10%. The growth rate of industry and service sectors per annum 
accounted for 13.2% and 8% respectively during 1994-2009, vis-à-vis agri-
culture at 4.7% for the same period. Despite the high growth rate, the 
macroeconomic performance is considered poorly diversified and the main 
source of growth is concentrated mainly in four sectors: agriculture, gar-
ment, construction, and tourism. 
Agriculture: 
Although agriculture accounted for 35% of GDP in 2009, approximate-
ly 60% of the population relies on the sector for their livelihood. Therefore, 
we can say that the growth of this sector has a significant implication for 
poverty reduction in Cambodia. The agriculture in Cambodia is driven 
mainly by the production of crops and is dominated by rice. According to 
the World Bank (2009), eighty percent of farmers grow rice, 60% of them 
for subsistence. Rice plantation covered 2.8 million ha in 2007, which is 
equivalent to two thirds of arable land and 90% of cultivated land in Cam-
bodia (NIS, 2008). The production of rice grew from 3.4 to 6.7 million tons 
between 1997 and 2007, a two-fold increase in 10 years. As the domestic 
consumption of rice in Cambodia is around 3 million tons, this means that 
Cambodia has about 3-4 million tons of paddy rice surplus for export.1)
 1)  The official amount of rice exports is considerably lower than the above figure. Export of rice 
without proper documents to neighboring countries is believed to dominate a large portion.
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Garments:
The garment sector has been and still is the main growth engine for 
Cambodia. The export of garment sector, which includes, textile, wearing 
apparel, and footwear sub-sectors (hereafter, it is called garment sector for 
simplicity), accounts for approximately 90% of Cambodia’s total exports 
and serves as the main engine of growth for the economic development of 
Cambodia today. Since its transition towards a market-oriented economy, 
the Cambodian government has been very active in attracting foreign in-
vestments into the country to complement its devastated domestic indus-
try after years of civil wars. In the mid-1990s, foreign investors, most of 
which were from Taiwan, Hong Kong, China (mainland), South Korea, 
among others came to seek cheap labor in the labor-intensive sector. The 
garment industry started to grow exponentially since then. The employ-
ment in this sector rose sharply from only 18,700 people in 1995, reached 
its peak at 335,000 in 2007, and then dropped to 278,400 people in 2009 
due to Lehman shock in the United States, the country to which Cambodi-
an exports approximately 60% of the total garment products (See Table 4). 
In 2010, as the world economy, including the US, recovered, garment ex-
ports from Cambodia also bounced back. 
Figure 2: Annual GDP and Sectoral Growth Rate, 1994-2009
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators Online. Accessed July 20, 2011.
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Table 4: Garment Factories and Its Employment in Cambodia
1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Number of Factories 20 190 247 290 292 284 243 262
Employment (thousand) 18.7 162.4 283.9 334.1 335 324.9 278.4 319.4
Source: Ministry of Commerce. (As of December for each year)
Note: The number of factories indicates the “effectively operating” factories, not the registered ones.
Apart from the cheap and abundant labor cost at home, the expansion 
of Cambodian garment sector is also largely attributed to the internation-
al institutional environment in textiles. In 1974, under the Multi Fiber Ar-
rangement (MFA) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
framework, major importing countries such as the U.S. and EU were able 
to establish bilateral agreements with major exporting countries including 
China by imposing import quantity restrictions in the name of domestic 
industry protection. This measure implied a serious limitation on those 
garment-exporting countries; yet, on the other hand, it also provided 
greater opportunities to smaller exporting countries that did not receive 
quantitative restriction (export quotas) or small countries with export quo-
tas but who could not utilize them to their full extent. This MFA served as 
a catalyst to promote investments of this sector in their home countries. 
Together with the establishment of WTO in 1995, the successor of GATT, 
which aimed to promote freer trade, it set an article on Agreement on Tex-
tiles and Clothing (ATC) to replace MFA by agreeing on a gradual phase-
out of quantity restriction. The deadline for a complete phase-out of MFA 
was January 1, 2005 and it was invalidated as planned. 
As for domestic environment, the government of Cambodia adopted a 
very liberal Law on Investment (LOI) in 1994, which was later amended in 
2003, aiming to invite foreign investments to revitalize the devastated do-
mestic economy. Another major push for the growth of the garment sector 
was the resumption of Normalized Trade Relationship (NTR) with the 
United States in 1996. Under the agreement of NTR, Cambodia was pro-
vided Most Favored Nation (MFN) status, enabling the country to export 
the products at MFN tariff rate.2) In the following year, the U.S. and EU 
further granted the Generalized System of Preference (GSP), enabling 
Cambodia to export even at a lower tariff rate. The combination of Cambo-
 2)  MFN tariff rate is, in principle, applied only among WTO members. Although Cambodia 
was not yet a WTO member until 2004, MFN status was provided to the country so that 
she could export the products at MFN rate just like other WTO members.
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dia’s LOI and export opportunity to U.S. and EU markets encouraged fac-
tory owners from Malaysia, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and other parts of 
Asia, who had already reached quota limits for their garment exports in 
their home countries to invest in Cambodia. 
The complete phase-out of MFA on Jan. 1, 2005, also meant the com-
plete liberalization of trade in textile and clothing under WTO framework. 
Many studies, including Nordas (2004), predicted that Cambodia would 
face fierce international competition in the international market, especial-
ly with giant producers like China and India. In contrast to those predic-
tions, Cambodian garment exports continued to expand steadily after 2005 
as can be seen in Table 5. 
Table 5: Cambodia’s Garments and Textiles Export (Unit: Million USD)
2001 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
USA 840.9 1546.1 1847.17 1956.53 1908.33 1512.62 1853.85
EU 323.33 503.1 601.04 654.25 689 644.71 809.48
Japan 9.21 23.5 29.37 28.5 25.17 44.56 86.47
ASEAN 1.86 2.29 2.56 3.18 10.76 6.92 9.91
Others 26.91 178.3 218.7 296.44 352.93 356.51 463.64
Total 1202.21 2253.29 2698.84 2938.9 2986.19 2565.32 3223.35
Source: Ministry of Economy and Finance.
Constructions:
In addition to the agriculture and garment sectors, the construction 
sector that has been booming since 2002, accounted for 7% of GDP in 2007 
and 0.7 point of GDP growth over 1998-2007 (World Bank, 2009). Construc-
tion of condominiums, business and shopping centers flourished in the cap-
ital city of Phnom Penh and its surroundings, causing the price of real es-
tate to double or even triple in a two or three year period. However, in late 
2008, together with the World Economic Crisis, the real estate bubble in 
Cambodia burst. As a result, many planned constructions were forced to 
delay or downsize. Two main factors can be considered as the direct cause 
of the slow-down of the construction sector. The first factor concerned the 
supply side. Some of the construction projects, either foreign-owned or do-
mestically owned, faced the capital constraint to finance the projects. In the 
case of the foreign-owned construction projects, the impact of the world eco-
nomic crisis negatively affected their parent companies in their home coun-
tries, and therefore resulted in difficulty in capital mobilization for the con-
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struction project in Cambodia. In the case of the domestically owned 
projects, the real estate bubble burst which later led to the tightening of 
bank loans and also caused cash flow difficulties for domestic firms.
The second factor was the demand side. Affected by the world econom-
ic crisis, the prospect for Cambodian economy as a whole was bearish. In 
addition, as some of the condominiums in Cambodia were bought in order 
to resell, in other words for speculative purposes, the bursting of the real 
estate bubble, like in many other emerging economies, caused the demand 
for condominiums to drop suddenly and the price of real estate to stag-
nate. Luckily, as the impact of the collapse of the real estate bubble turned 
out to short-lived, in 2010 the construction business regained its momen-
tum, especially in Phnom Penh to support the growing residential de-
mand. At present (as of August 2011), the construction of condominiums 
can be seen to be growing at an alarming rate, providing a warning signal 
of oversupply.
Tourism:
Tourism ranks as the second largest source of foreign currency earn-
ings for Cambodia after the garment sector, accounting for approximately 
1,800 million USD in 2010 from 830 million USD in 2005, a two-fold in-
crease in 5 years, reflecting the growing importance of this sector in the 
economy (See Figure 3). The main attraction of tourists to Cambodia 
largely rests on the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) world heritage site, Angkor Wat. Since 1993, af-
ter Cambodia reopened its doors to the world, the number of tourists start-
ed to increase steadily, on average by some 20% per annum. In addition to 
the attractiveness of the historical site itself, Angkor Wat, the Open Sky 
Policy that allowed the international airlines to fly directly to Siem Reap, 
the province where Angkor Wat is situated, also positively contributed to 
the increase of tourists. According to Sok Hach et al. (2001), the introduc-
tion of this policy, which was the strategy by the government of Cambodia 
and Thailand to increase tourists under the slogan “Two Kingdoms, One 
Destination”, has been proven successful. However, the heavy reliance on 
revenues from tourists to Angkor Wat alone has been considered too con-
centrated and unsustainable in the long run. Hence, the diversification 
and development of other tourist sites are needed.
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According to the Ministry of Tourism (2010), the number of tourists to 
Cambodia in 2010 was 2,508,289 people, a 16% point increase from 2009 
at 2,161,577 people. As for the tourists of country by origin, Vietnam 
ranked top at approximately 466,695 people and South Korea ranked sec-
ond at 289,702 in 2010, accounting for 18% and 12% of total tourists to 
Cambodia, respectively. In terms of the number of tourists by region, in 
2010, the tourists from ASEAN nations accounted for 34%, from Eastern 
Asia 28%, and from Europe 20%. This number reflects the importance of 
ASEAN nations on the tourism sector in Cambodia.
In summary, the foundation of Cambodian economy can be considered 
narrow-based and fragile, mainly concentrating on four sectors: agricul-
ture, garment, construction, and tourism. The people engaged in the agri-
cultural sector account for approximately 60% of the total population and 
many of them subsist on a low income. Therefore, the development of this 
sector is considered to have an important implication for poverty reduction 
for this impoverished nation. The garment sector, which is the main source 
of foreign exchange in Cambodia, played a very crucial role in employment 
generation for low-income workers. The construction sector started to 
boom in 2002 and burst in 2008 together with the world economic crisis. 
The impact of the bubble burst on the economy was short-lived. Since 
Figure 3: Trend of Tourists and Tourism Receipts to Cambodia, 1995-2010
Source: Ministry of Tourism, Tourism Statistics Report 2010.
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2010, this sector has regained its confidence and the construction of condo-
miniums has resumed its momentum. The tourism sector relied dominant-
ly on the revenue from tourists to Angkor Wat, UNESCO’s world heritage 
site. Therefore, diversification and development of other tourist sites are 
crucial for the sustainability of this sector. 
2.2 Cambodia’s Industrial Policies
Cambodia’s high economic growth in the past two decades was essen-
tially a result of the combination of economic reform policies in the early 
1990s, in addition to other reform policies and the political stability cli-
mate. These economic reform policies included the privatization of State-
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and the attraction of FDIs as the core policies. 
The main objective of privatization of SOEs was to reduce the government’
s fiscal burdens, which heavily depended on foreign aids. As Cambodia’s 
SOEs was relatively small in size and in technology accumulation, the pri-
vatization process was carried out rather smoothly. Secondly, to supple-
ment the devastated domestic industry, the attraction of foreign firms was 
essential for a number of reasons, including job creation, technology trans-
fer, and government revenue procurement.
2.2.1 Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises
The reforms of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) was characterized as 
one of the core economic policies to transform Cambodia from a centrally-
planned to a market-oriented economy in the late 1980s. State-Owned En-
terprises in Cambodia consist of three types: a) economic public enterprise; 
2) state company; c) joint-venture in which the State directly or indirectly 
holds more than 51% of the capital or voting rights. 
Similarly to other transition economies, SOEs in Cambodia faced the 
problems of: 1) degraded facilities; 2) inefficient and high cost production 
structure; 3) mismatch with the needs of the market; 4) deficits; and 5) ex-
cess staffing (Hirohata, 2004). However, the privatization of SOEs in Cam-
bodia was carried out relatively smoothly, which can primarily be attribut-
ed to three main reasons. First, Cambodia’s centrally-planned economic 
policy only lasted for 10 years (1979-1989). In 1979, Cambodia had just 
emerged from the Pol Pot regime where most of the infrastructure had 
been devastated and the rehabilitation and construction of the country 
had to start from scratch. The time span of 10 years is considered short for 
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the SOEs to build deep roots and linkages with other industries. Second, 
SOEs were basically small in scale. As a result, the impact on employment 
during the privatization could be minimized. Lastly, the policy options and 
pressure from the international aid community upon which Cambodia 
heavily relied, meant Cambodia had no choice but to accept the privatiza-
tion in the policy packages. 
The privatization of SOEs in Cambodia can be divided into two phas-
es. Phase one started in the late 1989 until and continued to the mid-1993. 
During this phase, Ministries simply privatized their own enterprises un-
der their direct supervision, negotiating the terms of sales/leases and 
brought the revenues directly into the Ministries’ budgets. Phase two 
started in the mid-1995, and was designed to tighten and centralize con-
trol over the whole process by an inter-ministerial privatization committee 
under the leadership of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (Hang, 
2008). 
In 1989, there were 187 SOEs in Cambodia. By the end of 2000, 160 
SOEs had been privatized, of which 139 were leased to the private sector, 
12 transformed into joint-ventures, and 8 sold outright and 8 liquidated 
(UNCTAD, 2003, p. 74). In 2007, there were 17 major SOEs operating in 
Cambodia with a total market capitalization of 6,195,887 million Riels 
(approximately 1.5 billion USD). The 17 SOEs employed 14,251 people, 
and the total revenue accounted for 1,503,257 million Riels (approximate-
ly 375 million USD) in 2007.
In conclusion, the privatization of SOEs in Cambodia was part of the 
policy packages, and a necessary policy choice for the country to move 
from a planned to market economy. The privatization itself was considered 
successful, given the short period of SOEs’ operation during the planned 
economic system and the relatively small scale of the enterprises.
2.2.2 Promotion of FDI
In August 1994, Law on Investment (LOI) passed the National Assem-
bly, signifying the beginning of the liberal foreign investment regime. 
Cambodia’s LIO, in principle, allowed FDI firms to engage in most sectors 
of the economy and to 100% ownership. A few sectors which were subject 
to conditions, local equity participation, or prior approval from the author-
ities included the manufacturing of cigarettes, movie production, rice mill-
ing, exploitation of gemstones, publishing and printing, radio and televi-
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sion, manufacturing wood and stone carvings, and silk weaving. 
In 2003, the 1994 LOI was amended to limit discretion, improve 
transparency and reduce administrative burden, as well as increase state 
tax revenues. In the amended LOI, as indicated in Table 6, corporate tax 
was raised to 20% from 9% for all projects, except for natural resource 
businesses, which was raised to 30%, and 9% or 0% for existing and tax ex-
empted qualified investors. This corporate tax exemption is automatically 
provided for 3 years and it can be extended, in principle, up to another 3 
years depending on the annual certificate and compliance of the firms. In 
addition, while reinvestment on profits and repatriation of earnings was 
tax-free in the 1994 LOI, under the 2003 amended LOI they are now sub-
ject to taxation. 
Table 6: Features of 1994 LOI and Amended 2003 LOI 
1994 Law on Investment 2003 Amended Law on Investment
Corporate tax rate 9% Corporate tax rate 20% for all projects, ex-
cept 30% for natural resource business; 9% 
or 0% for existing and tax exempted quali-
fied investors.
Corporate tax exemption of up to 8 years 
depending on the projects.
Tax exemption period: Trigger Period + 3 
years + Priority Period. Maximum Trigger 
Period is to be first year of profit or three 
years after QIP earns its first revenue, 
whichever is sooner.
Five year loss-carried forward. Five year loss-carried forward.
Tax free reinvestments on profits. Introduction of investment allowance (spe-
cial depreciation).
Tax free repatriation of earnings. Repatriation of earnings is subject to taxa-
tion.
Full import duty exemption for 80% export-
er.
Full import duty exemption for 100% ex-
porter.
No export tax. No export tax.
Decision to give Qualified Investment Pro-
ject (QIP) license has to be made   within 45 
working days.
Decision to give Qualified Investment Pro-
ject (QIP) license has to be made within 28 
working days. 
Source: Council for the Development of Cambodia
As indicated in Figure 4, FDI inflow into Cambodia was very low 
throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s. Starting from 2004, the annual 
FDI inflows rose sharply, making a 10-fold increase from its low level in 
2003 and its highest level in 2007. This increasing trend was, however, in-
terrupted by the Lehman Shock in 2008 which later turned into the world 
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economic crisis. Specifically, FDI inflows into Cambodia in 2009 dropped to 
539 million USD from 815 million USD in 2008.
Similarly, the ratio of FDI inflows to gross fixed capital formation was 
also on an increasing trend from 9.6% in 2003 to 51.9% in 2007, suggest-
ing the rising significance of foreign investments in the Cambodian econo-
my. Although the ratio of FDI inflows to gross fixed capital formation fluc-
tuates depending on the actual amount of FDI inflows each year, its 
average ratio during 2001-2010 accounted for 29.6%, almost twice that of 
Vietnam’s 17.1% during the same period. In other words, this phenomenon 
also confirms the underdevelopment of domestic investments and hence 
Cambodia had no choice but to rely on foreign sources of capital and tech-
nology to achieve economic development.
In terms of the country of origin of investors to Cambodia, China 
ranked top, followed by South Korea and Malaysia (See Figure 5). Invest-
ment from China during 1994-2010 totaled 7.7 billion USD and was dis-
tributed among many sectors, including garments, textiles, industrial 
parks, infrastructure, and hydropower. Investments from China are strate-
gic and a large portion of which directly contributed to the basic infra-
structure development and poverty reduction of the country. FDI inflows 
Figure 4: Trend of FDI and FDI-Gross Fixed Capital Formation Ratio
Source: UNCTAD 2011, Annex Table 1 and Table 5. 
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from South Korea were 3.9 billion USD during 1994-2010. Their main
investments are in real estate development, the banking sector, and con-
struction. For example, a South Korean financed construction project of a 
new town in Phnom Penh (CAMKO City) will cost 2 billion USD, with the 
project period of 2005-2018 and a land size of 119 ha. If the construction 
goes as planned, it will be the largest construction project in Cambodia.
2.2.3 Special Economic Zone
The establishment of the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Cambodia 
was based on a sub-decree No. 148 issued on Dec. 29, 2005. According to 
the sub-decree, the main objective of the establishment of SEZ is to pro-
vide and improve the investment climate conducive to the enhancement of 
productivity, competitiveness, national economic growth, export promotion, 
employment generation. The idea of the establishment of SEZ itself is not 
new for developing countries, especially for those whose infrastructure is 
insufficient and administrative procedures are complicated. The establish-
ment of SEZ generally complements the above shortages. 
Definition of SEZ:
According to the sub-decree No. 148, Article 3, the SEZ is defined as 
Figure 5: Approved Investments by Country/Region: 1994-2010 (Million USD)
Source: Council for the Development of Cambodia
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below:
a) It must have a land area of more than 50 hectares with a precise lo-
cation and geographic boundaries;
b) It must have a surrounding fence (for Export Processing Zone, the 
Free Trade Area and for the premises of each investor in each 
zone);
c) It must have management office buildings, zone administration of-
fices, a large road network, clean water, electricity, and telecommu-
nications networks, fire protection and security system. Based on 
each situation, the zone may have land reserved for the residential 
area for workers, employees and employers, public parks, infirmary, 
vocational training school, petroleum, restaurant, car parking, 
shopping center or market, etc.
d) It must comply with technical requirements, regulations and basic 
rules on construction, environment and other obligations in the de-
velopment of SEZ. 
Merits of Investing in SEZ:
According to the sub-decree No. 148 on SEZ, there is little difference 
between investment incentives with regards to investing inside or outside 
the SEZ. In principle, if the projects are granted a Final Registration Cer-
tificate (FRC) and approved as the Qualified Investment Project (QIP) by 
the Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC), the same tax incen-
tives are applied. However, the main merit for investors in investing in 
SEZ is the receipt of One-Stop-Service (OSS). The OSS is run by the Spe-
cial Economic Zone Administration (SEZA) which was set up by the Cam-
bodian Special Economic Zones Board (CSEZB) of the CDC. The SEZA is 
composed of representatives from CSEZB, the Customs and Excise depart-
ment, CAMCONTROL, the Ministry of Commerce (MOC), and the Minis-
try of Labor and Vocational Training (MLVT). Among them, the main duty 
of CSEZB staff is to deal with the issuance of tax exemption certificate for 
exports and imports, while Customs and Excise and CAMCONTROL staff 
deal with the inspection of goods moving into and out of SEZ. MOC staff 
deal with the issuance of the Rule of Origin (ROO) certificate, and MLVT 
staff deal with the employment support. Cambodia’s bureaucratic proce-
dures have been criticized for their complexity and unofficial costs; for this 
reason the One-Stop-Service provided by the government looks set to 
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bring a huge benefits for investors.
Current Situation of SEZ:
The development of SEZ, in general, is considered at a very early 
stage in Cambodia. The sub-decree of SEZ was issued in the end of 2005 
and the construction of the SEZ started in the following year. At present, 
21 SEZ have been approved throughout the country, but only six SEZ are 
operational (See Table 7). Out of the six operational SEZ, Phnom Penh 
SEZ (PPSEZ) is considered the most developed and the largest SEZ in 
Cambodia at present. It possesses a total land size of 360 hectares and is 
equipped with standardized facilities such as independent power plant (in 
case of black-out), independent water supply system, and waste water 
treatment facility. The construction of PPSEZ is divided into three phases. 
The construction of phase one with the land size of 141 ha has been com-
pleted and consists of industrial and commercial areas. At present (as of 
August 2011), 29 tenants have been contracted and 16 of them are cur-
rently operational. In terms of investing countries of origin, out of the 29 
contracted tenants at PPSEZ, 13 are Japanese firms including some inter-
national brands such as Ajinomoto, Minebea, and Yamaha Motors. The 
rest are shared by firms from Taiwan, Singapore, the Philippines, and oth-
er countries. 
Geographically, if we exclude PPSEZ and SEZ in Sihanoukville, most 
of the approved SEZ are situated along Thai or Vietnamese border. The lo-
cation of SEZ along the border, if they are developed as planned, is consid-
ered favorable for the investors. First, investors can have access to cheaper 
labor costs in comparison with Thailand and Vietnam. Second, as the elec-
tricity cost in Cambodia is higher than the neighboring countries, the bor-
der SEZ is able to buy and use cheaper electricity from neighboring coun-
tries. For example, electricity cost at SEZ at the Vietnamese border such 
as Manhattan SEZ and Tai Seng SEZ is only 0.1265 USD/kwh, while the 
electricity cost at PPSEZ is 0.193 USD/kwh. Third, as the SEZ is located 
at the border, the final products can be exported to the neighboring mar-
kets relatively quickly and with relatively cheap transportation costs. 
3. CONCLUSION 
ASEAN economic integration was expedited after the Asian Economic 
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Crisis in 1997 in order to cope with the growing influence of China and In-
dia in the region. The main objective of the integration is to create a single 
market and production base, a competitive economic region, equitable eco-
nomic development, and to achieve integration of the region into the global 
economy in order to make ASEAN a growing pole in the world economic 
system. However, development gaps, especially between the original mem-
bers and latecomers, have been the main obstacle for the integration. His-
torically, the economic success of members of ASEAN has been the result 
of each country’s individual policy, rather than of ASEAN as an institu-
tion. 
Particularly in the case of Cambodia, the government underwent a 
drastic economic reform after its transition towards a market economy in 
1989. The combination of SOEs privatization and FDI attraction, as the 
core economic policies, proved to be very successful for Cambodia to shift 
from an inward looking to an outward looking economic policy. The privati-
zation of SOEs contributed to the alleviation of the government’s fiscal 
burden and the attraction of FDI contributed to the employment creation, 
an increase in the state’s tax revenue, and in the long run, potential trans-
fer of technology. Given the advantage of cheap labor cost and access to 
major importing countries such the US and EU, Cambodia successfully at-
tracted FDI into the labor-intensive garment sector, which is the largest 
foreign currency earner for the country at present. In addition, the estab-
lishment of SEZ in 2006 also signifies the efforts of the government to 
strategically attract more FDI into the country. Geographically, if the ap-
proved SEZ are developed as planned, most of them will be situated near 
the Thai and Vietnamese border. This location will likely prove very impor-
tant for Cambodia as part of the production base in the regional division of 
labor, especially after the ASEAN economic integration in 2015. 
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